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Introduction
In Malaysia, the rule against hearsay is contained in 
section 60 of the Evidence Act 1950 (EA 1950). As is well 
known amongst lawyers practicing in a common law 
jurisdiction, hearsay is basically evidence that is not 
direct. Such evidence is normally inadmissible. As such 
the hearsay rule operates to prohibit a witness from 
reporting a statement made by another person where the 
truth of any fact asserted in that statement is incapable 
of being tested in court. The rationale was that if the 
original was not produced, there was a significant chance 
of error or fraud in relying on a copy. However, the rule 
against hearsay has evolved to give credence to relevancy 
of facts to be balanced by the weight to be attached to 
it by the trier of fact.1 The EA 1950 recognises certain 
exceptions, which are contained in sections 32 and 73A in 
respect of civil proceedings. Section 32 provides for the 
admissibility of statements, written or verbal, made by 
a person who had personal knowledge of relevant facts, 
who is dead or who cannot be found, or who has become 
incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot 
be procured without an amount of delay or expense 
which under the circumstances of the case appears to 
the court unreasonable.2 Section 73A EA1950 permits the 
admissibility of a statement even where its maker did 
not have personal knowledge of its contents, although 
the supplier of such information may have had personal 
knowledge of the facts.3 These include business records, 
public records (e.g., birth, death, or marriage certificates), 
official records, private records and res gestae 
statements. Recently, the hearsay rule came to be tested 
in the context of e-mail evidence in the Malaysian case of 
Avnet Azure Sdn. Bh.d v Eact Technologies Sdn Bhd and 
Sapura Research Sdn. Bhd.4
Facts
A claim for the sum of $109,614.40 arose from a tripartite 
‘goods sold and delivered’ contract for software licences. 
Avnet purchased certain ‘Telelogic’ software licences from 
IBM Singapore, at the order of Eact Technologies Sdn. 
Bhd. (ETSB), allegedly based on a requisition note from 
Sapura Research Sdn. Bhd. (Sapura) the third party. The 
software licence was delivered directly by IBM Singapore 
to the end user Sapura by way of a server-generated 
e-mail message with an attachment described as a ‘Proof 
of Entitlement’ for the licence. A key was supplied in 
the Proof of Entitlement, which had to be activated by 
logging into the internet to obtain the licence. There was 
no physical delivery of any product. From the internet, 
the customer would obtain the licence key to download 
and install the Telelogic software in its computer. Without 
the information contained in the Proof of Entitlement, 
the customer would not be able to complete the log-in 
process to successfully download the software.
As Avnet had paid IBM Singapore, it sought payment 
from ETSB, who in turn sought payment from Sapura. The 
crux of the problem was that Sapura denied having placed 
a firm purchase order for the IBM licence from ETSB, 
and further denied receipt of the Proof of Entitlement 
from IBM Singapore. On the contractual issue, the court 
found privity of contract between Avnet and ETSB and as 
between ETSB and Sapura. However, ETSB would only be 
liable to pay Avnet if delivery of the Proof of Entitlement 
to Sapura had been made. That Sapura had chosen not 
to activate the key, or the software licences had since 
expired, was not material to liability. Avnet based its claim 
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on the server generated e-mail message with the Proof 
of Entitlement as attachment sent by IBM Singapore to 
Avnet on 31 March 2009, marked exhibit ‘P4’. To admit 
this ‘computer’ evidence, Avnet tendered a certificate 
under section 90A(2) EA 1950 to establish that once this 
computer evidence was admitted upon production of the 
certificate, the truth of the contents must be held proven. 
However the court inquired into the statutory wording of 
section 90A(2) EA 1950, which requires a document to be 
‘produced by a computer in the course of its ordinary use’.
The court was referred to section 88A of the Indian 
Evidence Act 1872 which carries a presumption as to 
electronic messages:
88A. Presumption as to electronic messages.- The 
Court may presume that an electronic message, 
forwarded by the originator through an electronic mail 
server to the addressee to whom the message purports 
to be addressed corresponds with the message as fed 
into his computer for transmission; but the Court shall 
not make any presumption as to the person by whom 
such message was sent.
Explanation
For the purposes of this section, the expressions 
‘addressee’ and ‘originator’ shall have the same 
meanings respectively assigned to them in clauses 
(b) and (za) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the 
Information Technology Act, 2000.
The court found that the provision related to a 
presumption as to the contents of the message and the 
fact of sending, but not a presumption as to its receipt by 
the addressee.
The court was also referred to section 35 of the 
Evidence Act of Singapore5, which previously provided 
that:
s. 35 (1) computer output is admissible in court as 
primary evidence provided that it is:-
(a) expressly agreed between the parties to the 
proceedings at any time that neither its authenticity 
nor the accuracy of its contents are disputed;
(b) produced in an approved process; or
(c) shown by the party tendering such output that —
(i) there is no reasonable ground for believing 
that the output is inaccurate because of improper 
use of the computer and that no reason exists 
to doubt or suspect the truth or reliability of the 
output; and
(ii) there is reasonable ground to believe that at 
all material times the computer was operating 
properly, or if not, that in any respect in which it 
was not operating properly or out of operation, 
the accuracy of the output was not affected by 
such circumstances.
However, in respect to the Singapore provisions, the court 
was of the opinion that the specific statutory wording 
was dissimilar – ‘computer output’, was not upon the 
same matter or subject with the Malaysian document 
‘produced’ by a computer.
The court instead expressed its agreement with the 
view taken in Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Bhd. v 
Owners of the Ship or Vessel ‘Sasacom’,6 that ‘reliance 
on an e-mail without the maker being called is highly 
undesirable and is hearsay’. Thus, if the purpose is to 
establish that Sapura received the Proof of Entitlement, a 
section 90A(2) certificate cannot be read as overcoming 
such an objection. Exhibits P3 and P4 could only prove 
receipt by Avenet of these electronic documents. It 
cannot be extended to prove receipt of the Proof of 
Entitlement by Sapura. The weight to be attached to 
these two documents has therefore to be regarded as 
insufficient for this evidential purpose. The court also 
accepted the reference by ETSB’s counsel to the American 
case of Armstrong v Executive Office of the President,7 
to the effect that generally the production of a physical 
copy of an electronic record is insufficient since it omits 
fundamental pieces of information which will be an 
integral part of the original electronic record. Thus the 
court found that, in the case of e-mails, it was important 
to call the maker unless the case falls within the purview 
of section 90A of the Evidence Act. The court also referred 
to the commentary in Mason:8
‘A digital document may be authenticated by direct or 
circumstantial evidence, and circumstantial evidence 
includes a range of factors, including, but not limited 
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to, appearance and the contents of the document, 
the subject matter and any distinctive features that 
indicate nexus. Where the content demonstrates 
knowledge of the circumstances of the facts such 
that only very few people in the world will be aware 
of them, the inference as to authenticity must be 
overwhelming in most cases’.
Applying the same principles, the court held that 
exhibit lD12, which included a copy of a screen shot of 
a system status at IBM, Singapore sent by e-mail by 
IBM Malaysia to Avnet, produced in an attempt to prove 
that the automatically generated e-mail and Proof of 
Entitlement were received by Sapura would be hearsay 
and inadmissible unless the maker was called. The data 
in the e-mail, such as ‘message was mailed to: wanzil@
Sapura.com.mv’ user-type U’ could only be determined 
by calling the makers of the e-mail and the screenshot 
from IBM Singapore. As such, the court found that on the 
evidence, Avnet had failed to prove delivery of the licence 
to either Sapura Research or ETSB, and that Avnet should 
seek recovery from IBM Singapore.
The case raises several interesting evidentiary issues 
which are discussed below. The discussion is, however, 
limited to the specific information available in the 
reported judgment.
‘Document was produced by a computer in the 
course of its ordinary use’
Section 90A(2) EA 1950 provides a rebuttable 
presumption of fact that a document was produced by a 
computer ‘in the course of its ordinary use’, as follows:
‘For the purposes of this section it may be proved 
that a document was produced by a computer in the 
course of its ordinary use by tendering to the court 
a certificate signed by a person who either before or 
after the production of the document by the computer 
is responsible for the management of the operation of 
that computer, or for the conduct of the activities for 
which that computer was used.’
The section does not define ‘produce’ or ‘in the course of 
its ordinary use’. However, on the effect of the certificate 
in section 90A, the Court of Appeal in Gnanasegaran 
Pararajasingam v PP,9 went to great lengths to examine 
and clarify the provisions. Shaik Daud Ismail JCA clarified 
that under section 90(A)(1) there were two ways of 
proving ‘in the course of its ordinary use’ in order to admit 
computer generated documents into evidence:
(i) it may be proved by the production of the certificate 
as required by subsection (2). – This is permissive and 
not mandatory. Once tendered subsection (3) states 
that it shall be sufficient and be prima facie proof of all 
matters stated in it. This can also be seen in subsection 
(4) which begins with the words ‘Where’ a certificate 
is given under sub-section (2) …
or
(ii) by calling the maker of the document which is 
the usual method to admit and prove any form of 
documentary evidence. Therefore a certificate is not 
required to be produced in every case.
Once the prosecution adduces evidence through a bank 
officer that the document is produced by a computer, it is 
not incumbent upon them to produce a certificate under 
sub-section (2). As for the certificate, it shall be sufficient 
under section 90A(3) for a matter to be stated to the best 
of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it. It 
shall then be admissible in evidence as prima facie proof 
of all matters stated in it without proof of signature of the 
person who gave the certificate. The court further clarified 
that the effect of section 90A(1) was that it was no longer 
necessary to call the actual teller or bank clerk who keyed 
in the data to testify, provided he did so in the ‘course of 
the ordinary use of the computer’. This was a relaxation of 
the direct evidence rule in section 60 EA 1950, following 
the provisions in section 32(b) EA 1950 in the case of 
documents made in the ordinary course of business. A 
situation could thus arise under section 90A(1) where 
the particular person who keyed in the information may 
not be individually identifiable, but the document would 
nevertheless be admissible. This was confirmed by the 
Federal Court in PP v Hanafi Mat Hassan [2003] 6 CLJ 459.
Therefore it is submitted that the reverse should also 
apply. Section 4(2) EA 1950 provides the necessary 
clarification:
‘Whenever it is directed by this Act that the court shall 
presume a fact, it shall regard the fact as proved unless 
and until it is disproved’.
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Here ‘shall’ indicates that the court has no discretion 
in the operation of the presumption which can only be 
rebutted by evidence to the contrary. Once a section 
90A(2) certificate is submitted, it is no longer necessary to 
call the maker to prove that the ‘document was produced 
by a computer in the course of its ordinary use’, and 
under subsection (3) the certificate ‘shall’ be proof of the 
authenticity and reliability of its contents. It therefore 
operates as a statutory exception to the hearsay rule.
If the contents of the certificate were to be challenged, 
the evidential burden of disproving it would be on the 
party challenging its credibility. In this respect, section 
4(2) EA 1950 states that ‘whenever it is directed by this 
Act that the court shall presume a fact, it shall regard the 
fact as proved unless and until it is disproved’. In this 
respect, the section 90A(2) certificate was successfully 
challenged in Navi & Map Sdn. Bhd. v Twincie Sdn. 
Bhd. & Ors.10 Here, the plaintiff produced a certificate 
pursuant to s 90A EA 1950 for admission of the print-out 
of a communication by way of a Skype chat, duly signed 
by a digital evidence specialist from the Digital Forensic 
Department in Cyber Security. However, the certificate 
under s 90A(2) certified that the specialist was not the 
officer responsible for the management and analysis of 
the computer that produced the Skype chat. Furthermore, 
the certificate did not certify that the document was 
produced in the course of its ordinary use or that it was in 
good working order, and in fact portions of the Skype chat 
were missing. Thus the print-out of the Skype chat was 
ruled inadmissible on the basis of the clear statement in 
the certificate itself, unlike in Avnet.
Difference in statutory wordings ‘computer 
output’ and document ‘produced’
Plaintiff’s counsel referred to section 35 of the Singapore 
Evidence Act to show ‘computer output’ to be admissible 
in court as primary evidence provided that it was 
produced by an ‘approved process’; there was no 
reasonable grounds for suspecting the inaccuracy of the 
‘output’ or its truth and reliability; and that there were 
reasonable grounds for believing that the computer was 
operating properly. However the court could not reconcile 
the statutory wordings ‘computer output’ in the Singapore 
provision with the Malaysian provision of document 
‘produced’ by a computer.
The author respectfully disagrees, because ‘computer 
output’ in the Singapore Evidence Act was previously 
defined as:
‘a statement or representation (whether in audio, 
visual, graphical, multi-media, printed, pictorial, 
written or any other form) —
(a) produced by a computer, or
(b) accurately translated from a statement or 
representation so produced’.
The Malaysian Evidence Act does not define ‘produced’. 
However, ‘document’ is defined in section 3 EA 1950 in the 
broadest possible terms to include letters, figures, marks, 
symbols, signals, signs, or other forms of expression, 
description, or representation in various media such as 
visual, sound, electronic magnetic, mechanical, and by 
means of a recording, or transmission, over a distance of 
any matter by any, or any combination, of these means. 
Under the illustration to the word ‘document’, it is given 
that: ‘A matter recorded, stored, processed, retrieved or 
produced by a computer is a document’.
‘Computer’ was defined as any device for recording, 
storing, processing, retrieving or producing any 
information or other matter, or for performing any 
one or more of those functions, by whatever name or 
description such device is called; and where two or more 
computers carry out any one or more of those functions 
in combination or in succession or otherwise howsoever 
conjointly, they shall be treated as a single computer.11
In view of the above, it is respectfully submitted that 
the statutory wordings are upon the same matter or 
subject. The terms ‘computer output’ would have the 
same meaning as a ‘document produced by a computer’. 
The provisions in section 35 of the Singapore Evidence 
Act would in fact reflect the presumption in section 90A(3) 
as to the accuracy and reliability of the document and 
section 90A(4) as to the proper working of the computer. 
By that token it should be taken to establish that the 
computer was satisfactorily performing its functions.
However it should be noted that sections 35 and 36 
have now been repealed and replaced with section 116A, 
which introduces three presumptions as to accuracy, 
reliability and authenticity, set out in full below for 
completeness:
Presumptions in relation to electronic records
116A.—(1) Unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt 
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about the presumption is adduced, where a device 
or process is one that, or is of a kind that, if properly 
used, ordinarily produces or accurately communicates 
an electronic record, the court shall presume that in 
producing or communicating that electronic record 
on the occasion in question, the device or process 
produced or accurately communicated the electronic 
record.
Illustration
A seeks to adduce evidence in the form of an 
electronic record or document produced by an 
electronic device or process. A proves that the 
electronic device or process in question is one 
that, or is of a kind that, if properly used, ordinarily 
produces that electronic record or document. This 
is a relevant fact for the court to presume that in 
producing the electronic record or document on 
the occasion in question, the electronic device or 
process produced the electronic record or document 
which A seeks to adduce.
(2) Unless evidence to the contrary is adduced, 
the court shall presume that any electronic record 
generated, recorded or stored is authentic if it is 
established that the electronic record was generated, 
recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course 
of business by a person who was not a party to the 
proceedings on the occasion in question and who did 
not generate, record or store it under the control of the 
party seeking to introduce the electronic record.
Illustration
A seeks to adduce evidence against B in the form 
of an electronic record. The fact that the electronic 
record was generated, recorded or stored in the 
usual and ordinary course of business by C, a 
neutral third party, is a relevant fact for the court to 
presume that the electronic record is authentic.
(3) Unless evidence to the contrary is adduced, 
where an electronic record was generated, recorded 
or stored by a party who is adverse in interest to the 
party seeking to adduce the evidence, the court shall 
presume that the electronic record is authentic in 
relation to the authentication issues arising from the 
generation, recording or storage of that electronic 
record.
Illustration
A seeks to adduce evidence against B in the form 
of an electronic record. The fact that the electronic 
record was generated, recorded or stored by B, who 
opposes the relevance of the evidence, is a relevant 
fact for the court to presume that the electronic 
record is authentic.
Under section 116A(1), there is a presumption that the 
device accurately communicated the record. This is an 
important presumption and is a logical provision based on 
the ‘proper working’ of the device.
Proof of receipt of e-mail and attachment
Plaintiff’s counsel also referred to section 88A of the 
Indian Evidence Act for assistance. However, the section 
does not carry a presumption that the message was 
successfully transmitted and received by the addressee. 
However the new section 116A(1) of the Singapore 
Evidence Act carries a presumption that the electronic 
device accurately communicated the record. In the 
absence of a similar presumption as to electronic 
communication in the Malaysian EA 1950, it is possible to 
refer to an analogous presumption in section 16 EA 1950 
in respect of the proper dispatch and receipt of a postal 
communication, namely section 16 EA 1950.
The existence of a course of business when 
relevant
When there is a question whether a particular act was 
done, the existence of ‘any course of business’, according 
to which it naturally would have been done, is a relevant 
fact. The illustration below is provided in the statute 
under section 16 EA 1950:
(a) The question is whether a particular letter was 
dispatched.
The facts that it was the ordinary course of business 
for all letters put in a certain place to be carried to the 
post, and that particular letter was put in that place, 
are relevant.
(b) The question is whether a particular letter reached 
A.
For instance, the Privy Council in Harihar Banerji v 
Ramsashi Roy12 held that if a letter, properly directed, 
was put into the post office, it is presumed that the letter 
reached its proper destination according to the regular 
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course of business of the post office and was received by 
the person to whom it was addressed. The Indian court 
in Jugal Kishore v Bombay Revenue Tribunal followed 
this.13 Similarly, in Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd. v Lim 
Tow Choon14 it was held that in order to prove the service 
of a letter, it is sufficient for a party to show that it was 
correctly addressed, prepaid, delivered to the post office 
and acknowledged for service by the postal authority. 
Furthermore, section 12 of the Interpretation Act 1948 
provides for a presumption that when the law provides 
or authorises a document to be served by post then until 
the contrary is proved, service shall be presumed to have 
been effected by the proper addressing, prepaying and 
posting by registered post. This presumption could be 
extended by analogy to e-mails sent by computers. This 
may be read together with section 114 EA 1950, which 
gives the court discretion to presume certain facts:
‘The court may presume the existence of any fact which 
it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to 
the common course of natural events, human conduct, 
and public and private business, in their relation to the 
facts of the particular case’.
In Avnet, the plaintiffs led oral evidence that the Proof 
of Entitlement was sent by e-mail directly to Sapura, but 
Sapura did not produce the document. The real issue 
in Avnet was that exhibit P4 relied on by the plaintiff 
was an e-mail message with the Proof of Entitlement 
attached, and sent by IBM Singapore to Avnet – and 
not to Sapura – although in evidence, it was stated that 
IBM Singapore sent the Proof of Entitlement directly to 
Sapura. As such, exhibit P4 was correctly rejected on this 
basis. In support of exhibit P4, the plaintiff attempted to 
tender ID12, which was a screen shot of a ‘system status’ 
from IBM Singapore stating that ‘message was mailed 
to: wanzil@Sapura.com.mv’ user-type U’. This document 
ID13 was sent by e-mail by IBM Malaysia to Avnet at their 
request. The e-mail also contained an explanation that 
because the electronic Proof of Entitlement to Sapura was 
‘auto generated’, it was not stored. However the system 
showed ‘green’, indicating that it had been successfully 
sent to the addressee, ‘wanzil@Sapura.com.mv’ user-type 
U’. This document was rejected on two grounds, first, that 
it came from IBM Malaysia although it originated from 
IBM Singapore, and secondly it was hearsay because 
the makers were not called. In this context, the decision 
of the court in the case of Ng Yiu Kwok And Ors V Public 
Prosecutor,15 is of relevance:
‘In a situation like this where the documents were 
prepared in the course of business and the makers 
were outside the jurisdiction who refused or were 
unwilling to come to this country, all the court should 
need to satisfy the requirement of section 32(b) EA 
1950 was that there was some evidence to show 
that the makers’ attendance could not be procured 
without delay or expense which the court considered 
unreasonable under the circumstances.’
It is further suggested that if the plaintiff had tendered 
sufficient oral evidence of a ‘course of business’ between 
Avnet, IBM Malaysia and IBM Singapore in relation to 
the contract with ETSB and Sapura, the objection to 
hearsay would have been overcome under the ‘relevancy 
of the facts’ as set out in section 16 EA 1950. The court 
could then have exercised its inherent discretion under 
section 114 illustration (f) EA 1950, that ‘the common 
sense of business has been followed’, to admit the 
evidence of ID12 and 13 as corroborating exhibit P4. 
Once a presumption is activated, the evidential burden 
of proof is shifted to the party denying the existence of 
the facts.16 The court must consider whether the evidence 
adduced is sufficient to rebut the presumption on a 
balance of probabilities.17 As the facts stand, the judgment 
does not refer to any rebutting evidence from Sapura or 
ETSB. In the absence of rebutting evidence, a bare denial 
would not be sufficient, although how much evidence 
is to be adduced would depend on the nature of the 
requirement.18
E-mail evidence and hearsay
The court took the view as expressed in Bank 
Pembangunan Malaysia Bhd. v Owners of the Ship 
or Vessel ‘Sasacom’,19 that ‘reliance on an e-mail 
without the maker being called is highly undesirable 
and is hearsay’. With respect, the facts of the case are 
different, and bear distinguishing. Here, the plaintiff Bank 
Pembangunan Malaysia Berhad (BPMB), took over the 
rights and interests of Bank Industri & Teknologi Malaysia 
Berhad (BITKM) pursuant to a vesting order. One of such 
rights was the liability of the defendant, Sasacom Sdn 
Bhd (Sasacom), an owner and builder of ships. BITKM had 
granted a RM9m term loan to Sasacom secured amongst 
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other things by a first preferred mortgage over one of the 
latter’s vessels ‘Sasacom I’ (the vessel). On Sasacom’s 
failure to remedy its default in repayments under the 
loan, the bank filed an admiralty action to seize and sell 
the vessel. The vessel was arrested, but sank before it 
could be sold. While the plaintiff claimed the balance of 
payment due, the defendant disputed the accounts and 
counter claimed an amount as overpayment. As proof 
of the overpayment, the defendant exhibited an e-mail 
dated 26 November 2008 from one Abdullah Bahjat 
Hasan, who bore the designation of Director-General of 
Heavy Engineering Equipment Co, Ministry of Industry 
& Minerals, Bhagdad/Iraq and addressed to one Mr Kiu 
Chiong Ming, in which he said they have a letter from 
Jordon National Bank dated 29 November 2002 which 
shows that the defendant had received ‘2,172,460$’. In 
this case, there were multiple layers of hearsay which 
did not qualify under any of the recognised exceptions 
to the rule. The contents of the e-mail were also not 
authenticated either directly, or through circumstantial 
evidence establishing a nexus, as indicated in Mason 
(previously referred to). Further, at no time prior to the 
action had the accounts been disputed. It was in the light 
of the totality of the evidence that the e-mail was held to 
be inadmissible for hearsay.
Next, counsel for ETSB referred to the American case of 
Armstrong v Executive Office of the President contending 
that the production of a physical copy of an electronic 
record is insufficient, since it might omit fundamental 
pieces of information which will be an integral part of the 
original electronic record. While it is acknowledged that a 
print-out does not show metadata that may be contained 
in the e-mail, it is a fact that except for audio and video 
recordings, other forms of ‘computer’ documents are 
not tendered in their native format in Malaysian courts. 
This is the reason for the introduction of the statutory 
presumption in section 90A(2). A party wishing to 
challenge its authenticity will have to bear the evidential 
burden of rebutting it. Mere conjecture and speculation 
would not suffice to discharge the burden. Armstrong 
sought to prohibit the erasing of electronic records in 
the last few days of the Reagan Administration in 1989. 
The District Circuit Court ruled that electronic mail and 
word processing files must be managed as government 
records, and it sent the case back to the District Court 
to determine whether the government’s removal of the 
records at the end of the Bush Administration warranted 
sanctions for contempt of court. Shortly after the court’s 
decision, the National Archives adopted new regulations 
on the preservation of electronic records. This case was 
commenced prior to the transition to e-government 
when there was an absence of awareness and rules 
on recording, and archiving. So the factual matrix in 
Armstrong was entirely different.
In United States v Safavian,20 the court admitted e-mails 
based on the e-mail addresses contained in the ‘to’ and 
‘from’ fields, and because other identifiable matters such 
as the work involved, signatures, and other personal and 
professional references pointed to their authenticity. The 
court permitted other e-mails to be authenticated under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 901(b)(3) by allowing 
the comparison of e-mail addresses and formats to permit 
related e-mails into evidence.
The basic issue regarding the admissibility of 
electronically stored information (ESI) which includes 
e-mails, came to be tested in Lorraine v Markel American 
Ins. Co.21 The plaintiff sought to recover under his 
insurance policy, the damage to his boat that had been 
struck by lightning. The defendants paid out the initial 
claim. However, there was a second claim when it was 
discovered that there was damage to the hull of the boat. 
The issue of whether the damage to the hull was caused 
by lightning was referred for arbitration. An application 
was filed for summary judgment, and various e-mails 
were relied upon. Grimm J scrutinised and analysed the 
‘evidentiary hurdles’ before ESI could be admitted into 
evidence. The relevant provisions of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence (FRE) for consideration were Rules 104, 401, 
403, 901and 902, 801 and 1001-1008. The first rule for 
admissibility is that evidence should be relevant.22 Then 
he went on to consider the foundation for authenticity,23 
and the available methods for authentication ranging 
from oral testimony of a witness, comparison of previous 
specimens, circumstantial evidence, public records, as 
well evidence from an accurate process or system.24 
The FRE also provides for self authentication through 
official publication, inscriptions, and regularly conducted 
business.25 Once evidence is relevant and authentic it 
must also overcome any hearsay objections.26
Thus to ensure that e-mail evidence will be admitted 
into evidence, a proper foundation for its authenticity 
must be laid. This could be done by either direct or 
circumstantial evidence, which may be gained from the 
content of the e-mail itself. ‘Computer’ data that is offered 
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20  2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32284 (D.D.C. May 23, 
2006).
21 241 F.R.D. 534 (D.Md. 2007).
22 Rule 401.
23 Rule 104.
24 Rule 901.
25 Rule 902.
26 Rule 801 and the exceptions to hearsay as 
contained in Rules 803, 804 and 807.
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for the truth of the matter asserted would generally fail 
as hearsay and thus be inadmissible under evidentiary 
rules. To admit the e-mails as direct evidence, a party 
would have to satisfy any of the statutory exceptions to 
the hearsay rule.
Conclusion
This case reflects the continuing challenges faced in 
admitting and authenticating documents produced by 
a ‘computer’. There is an urgent need for all parties to 
the litigation process to be educated on the nature of 
‘computer’ evidence and the necessary foundation for its 
admission and authentication. Many of these issues could 
well be addressed during the pretrial case management 
stage. Under the Rules of Court 2012 Order 24 rule 3 it 
would be open to the plaintiff to apply for discovery and:
‘the court may at any time order any party to a cause or 
matter (whether begun by writ or …) to give discovery 
by making and serving on any other party a list of 
documents which are or have been in his possession, 
custody or power …’
Further, under Order 24 rule 4 a party may be ordered to 
discover:
(a) Documents on which the party relies or will rely; and
(b) The documents which could –
(i) Adversely affect his own case
(ii) Adversely affect another party’s case; or
(iii) Support another party’s case
It would therefore have been open to the plaintiff to seek 
discovery of the e-mails in Sapura’s server log pertaining 
to the Proof of Entitlement. Should Sapura have failed 
to obey such an order, then it would have been open to 
the court under Order 24 rule 16 to make such order as 
it thinks just, including an order to dismiss the claim or 
that the defense be struck out and judgment be entered 
accordingly. Electronic evidence is upon us whether we 
like it or not. It is recommended that with the increasing 
volume of ‘computer’ evidence, there is a clear need for 
lawyers to understand the technical rules relating to 
electronic evidence and hearsay, and, incidentally, for 
lawyers to more fully understand their responsibilities 
to educate their clients in the preservation of ESI, which 
ultimately leads the need to collect, preserve and disclose 
evidence in electronic format.
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